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THE LIMITS OF EMPIRICISM: 
WHAT FACTS TELL US 
Comments on Daniel Keating's 
'Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action' 
Dennis Patterson* 
INTRODUCTION 
The conventional legal academic wisdom about empiricism is that 
empirical information is by-and-large a good thing, that we need more 
of it, and that empirical analysis is preferable to many scholarly alter­
natives now on offer in the law review literature.1 I do not dispute the 
proposition that, all things considered, empirical information is a good 
thing. What I question is the notion that empirical information neces­
sarily leads to knowledge.2 Put differently, it is one thing to marshal 
the facts, and another to know what to make of the facts.3 
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law (Camden). B.A. 
1976, M.A. 1978, J.D. 1980, Ph.D. 1980 (Philosophy), University of Buffalo. - Ed. My 
thanks to Richard Hyland for helpful comments on drafts of these comments. Thanks also 
to Chris Svoboda for her excellent research. 
1. The ardor of some who call for more empirical work has led to statements that would 
bring joy to the heart of a logical empiricist See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren & Jay Westbrook, 
Searching For Reorganizing Realities, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1257, 1262-63 (1994) (footnote 
omitted): 
We will readily concede that our own commitment to empirical research is more than simply 
a matter of principle. We enjoy thinking about reality. We find great satisfaction in strug­
gling to impose some coherence upon its unruly facts. We relish being utterly surprised, 
even flummoxed for a while, by some unexpected fact We find it exhilarating to bring fact 
and theory together to speculate about the power of law to affect the world we observe. By 
contrast, we find reading purely theoretical articles rather like playing anagrams. They are 
fun, but not filling. 
2. I actually think the point goes deeper, but this is not the place to explore the issue in 
depth. It is enough to mention that it is far from clear that any consistent distinction can be 
maintained between theory and fact. See Willard Van Orman Quine, Two Dogmas of Em· 
piricism, in FROM A LoGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20, 42-46 {2d ed. 1961); see also PAUL 
FEYERABEND, AGAINSTMETIIOD 19 (1975) ("[S]cience knows no 'bare facts' at all but that 
the 'facts' that enter our knowledge are already viewed in a certain way and are, therefore, 
essentially ideational."). I discuss the jurisprudential dimensions of these issues in DENNIS 
PATIERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 151-79 (1996). 
3. Of course, one's starting point is crucial; and no number of "facts" can alter that. See 
Douglas Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 574 (1998): 
To be sure, new information requires scholars and policymakers to update their prior beliefs, 
but rarely will so much information be available that differences can be resolved among 
those who begin at separate starting places. Strongly held prior beliefs will converge only if 
new information is plentiful. Among modern bankruptcy scholars, the starting places are far 
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I shall raise these points both in a general way and with specific 
reference to Professor Keating's fine contribution to the literature on 
U.C.C. section 2-207.4 I applaud Professor Keating's efforts to un­
cover the facts surrounding the implementation and effectiveness of 
section 2-207. I agree with his observation that much of the literature 
in commercial law, and on section 2-207 in particular, simply assumes 
a worldview that may or may not be consistent with the way the world 
is. That said, I want to suggest that it takes more than knowledge of 
the way the world is to know what to do with section 2-207. While I 
disagree with some of Professor Keating's conclusions, I believe he 
makes a valuable contribution to the continuing discussion of one of 
the most nettlesome provisions of the U.C.C. Finally, I shall comment 
briefly on the latest revision of section 2-207, which looks quite prom­
ising. 
THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
Professor Keating begins by observing that many people who write 
about section 2-207 do so against a background of dubious factual as­
sumptions. The principal mistake scholars make is that section 2-207 
"plays out in the field"5 in ways that bear little relation to its language 
and structure. As he puts it: "[T]he classic battle of the forms situa­
tion seems to be, for a variety of reasons, much less prevalent than one 
would guess from reading most academic literature in this area."6 Pro­
fessor Keating's message is that there is a disconnect between the law 
on the books and the real-world problems it addresses. As further 
proof of the disconnect, Professor Keating reports that, without any 
legal incentives, firms "have shifted to drafting less one-sided forms, at 
least as to issues that are not seen as critical.m 
Let me start by noting a piece of data me.ntioned in Professor 
Keating's article. We know from the pioneering work of Stuart 
Macaulay that for many firms, especially repeat players, explicit legal 
norms are not the most important dimension of the contracting con­
text. 8 Over time, parties feel themselves governed more by norms cen­
tral to their long-term relationship than to common law rules or the 
rules in the U.C.C. It is against this background that Professor 
Keating asks the question: To what extent do merchants using forms 
actually find themselves in disputes about whose form controls? Pro-
4. See Daniel Keating, Exploring The Battle of The Forms in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
2678 (2000). 
5. Id. at 2680. 
6. Id. at 2681. 
7. Id. 
8. See Stuart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
AM. Soc. REV. 55 {1963). 
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fessor Keating reports that "virtually all of [the people he interviewed] 
said that post-sale disputes which depended upon conflicting forms 
were extremely rare and that litigation on the subject was rarer still."9 
With respect to the question of how many firms might be involved 
in section 2-207 litigation,10 I think Professor Keating asks the wrong 
question. To get a sense of this point, focus your attention, not on sec­
tion 2-207, but on any other Code provision. Many firms never litigate 
any of the important provisions in the Code, yet, we certainly think 
every effort should be made to draft those provisions as well as possi­
ble. It is not at all clear to me that the best measure of the importance 
or significance of a Code section is the number of reported cases one 
finds in the case reporters.11 
THE PEDAGOGICAL DIMENSION 
Let us leave the realm of the empirical and tum our attention to 
pedagogy. If, as Professor Keating maintains, section 2-207 has had a 
limited impact on the world of commerce, is there anything it can 
teach us about commercial law or practice? Professor Keating be­
lieves that we remain fascinated with section 2-207 because "it pro­
vides a classic model for teaching students about the intricacies of 
statutory constructio.n. "12 
On this point, I could not disagree more. Not only does the pres­
ent section 2-207 teach students almost nothing about the proper in­
terpretive approach to the Code, I believe it reinforces some of the 
more dangerous pathologies of modem legal culture. Chief among 
these pathologies is the notion that legal problems are best resolved 
through application of a formula or inflexible employment of a 
method. 
The current section 2-207 requires that one of the two forms in 
question be labeled "the offer" and the other "the acceptance." 
Without this initial determination, the analysis cannot get off the 
ground. And yet, it seems almost gratuitous in many cases to label ei­
ther form "the offer" or "the acceptance." 
9. Keating, supra note 4, at 2696. 
10. While it may be true that the people interviewed by Professor Keating do not litigate 
many section 2-2ITT matters, a perusal of the UCCRS shows that section 2-207 is a heavily 
litigated section of the Code. I am not certain that it is safe to extrapolate from Professor 
Keating's sample to the world of commerce generally. 
11. This is perhaps the clearest example of my point that it is not the facts, but what we 
make of the facts, that is important. Even if it is true that a given section of the Code is not 
the subject of many reported cases, that does not necessarily mean that it is not significant or 
important. Perhaps it is best to say that the number of reported decisions is not the best or 
only measure of significance or importance. 
12. Keating, supra note 4, at 2679. 
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Consider a seller who sells through a widely-circulated catalog. In 
the catalog, interested buyers can find a section labeled "Terms of 
Sale." In this section, the seller sets forth all the principal terms upon 
which it sells its goods. 
A buyer reading the catalog, and being fully apprised of the seller's 
terms, may nonetheless send a form to the seller that contains terms 
materially different from those in the seller's catalog. If the seller re­
ceives the buyer's order and ships the goods with an invoice referenc­
ing the terms found in its catalog, that invoice will be deemed an "ac­
ceptance." Terms in the seller's invoice that are additional to or 
different from those in the buyer's order form will be knocked out.13 
Because section 2-207 limits the inquiry into the meaning of the par­
ties' agreement to the forms alone, there can be no inquiry into the na­
ture of the trade practice, the knowledge of the buyer, nor the econ­
omy of the transaction. All issues are resolved by reference to the 
forms alone. 
Contrast this picture with the capacious approach to agreement 
found everywhere else in the Code, and articulated in section 1-201(3). 
Here we learn that, under the Code, the point of the inquiry is to find 
"the bargain of the parties in fact."14 The bargain of the parties in fact 
is the product of three sources: express terms, course of dealing, usage 
of trade, and additionally, in the case of Articles 2 and 2A, course of 
performance. Thus, in every instance, from Article 2 Sales Contracts, 
to Article 5 Letters of Credit, to Article 9 Security Agreements, the 
Code's interpretive palette is broad, contextually-sensitive and, most 
importantly, centered on the common law judge. 
Rightly or wrongly, Llewellyn's jurisprudence15 - reflected in the 
Code - is grounded in the belief that the agreement of the parties is a 
construct from a variety of sources.16 Discerning how these elements 
come together to generate an agreement is a sublime art.17 Far from 
presenting any generalizeable lessons about contract formation or in­
terpretation, the present section 2-207 stands out as a stunning anom­
aly. 
13. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2). 
14. u.c.c. § 1-201(3). 
15. For criticism of Llewellyn's view of the relationship between commercial practices 
and commercial law norms, see Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975). 
16. I discuss this in Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability and Discretionary 
Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEXAS L. 
REV. 169 (1989). 
17. For discussion of the centrality of agreement to the Code, see RICHARD HYLAND & 
DENNIS PATTERSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL LAW 27-90 (1999). 
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THE NEW (NEW) SECTION 2-207 
When I read my paper at the conference that gave rise to this sym­
posium, I finished with the recommendation that section 2-207 be 
abolished. My reasoning was simple. Notwithstanding protracted re­
form efforts, generations of reformers had failed to solve even the 
most basic problems of section 2-207.18 In addition, Professor 
Kea ting's research showed that whatever the content of section 2-207, 
it could have little or no impact. Hence my suggestion that, all things 
considered, it might be best to abolish section 2-207.19 
I was chided for this suggestion, and by a person with good reason. 
Professor J.J. White heard my remarks and maintained that the very 
latest version of section 2-207 - which he and fellow members of the 
current Article 2 drafting committee had just completed - answered 
all of my objections.20 I am pleased to say that I think he may be right. 
I will refrain from providing a detailed commentary on this latest 
revised section 2-207, but I will take the liberty of making a few obser­
vations about its most salient features. It is these features that repre­
sent both a substantial departure from previous reform efforts and, 
thus, do the most to engender hope that, at last, we may have a section 
2-207 that we can live with. 
First, section (1) of the new (New) section 2-207 embraces the 
Code concept of agreement (see subsection (b)) and, at the same time, 
rejects all efforts to label one or the other form as "the offer" or "the 
acceptance." This means that courts must look at the documents (Re­
cords) in the commercial context to determine the substance of the 
parties' agreement. As with the inquiry into "Agreement" found 
elsewhere in the Code, the Agreement of the parties - their "bargain 
in fact" - is a construction of the court. 
How might the new (New) section 2-207 work out in practice? Let 
us turn again to our catalog seller. Assume that the Terms of Sale 
spelled out in her catalog include the following: 
18. For example, the fact that the buyer almost always gets the better of the deal. 
19. In this regard, I was following the suggestion of my colleague, Richard Hyland. See 
Richard Hyland, Draft, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 {1997). In Draft, Hyland argues decisively 
for repeal of the existing section 2-207. Additionally, in words that presage the next revision 
of section 2-207, Hyland writes: "Once we agree to permit the courts to decide the question 
of whether a contract was formed, there is no reason to take from them the question of the 
content of the parties' obligations. That is what courts do every day in commercial 
cases .. .. " Id. at 1357. The comments to the new (New) section 2-207, show that the draft­
ers completely embrace Hyland's suggestion that matters of section 2-207 contract interpre­
tation be returned to the discretion of the common law judge. 
20. The Text and Comments of the new (New) section 2-207 are appended to these 
comments. 
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1. There is an express warranty of 90 days from date of delivery 
for all items in this catalog. All other warranties, express or 
implied, are hereby disclaimed. 
2. Remedies are limited to repair or replacement of defective 
goods. 
Buyer orders out of the catalog, sending a form that includes the 
following on the back of its form: "No disclaimer of warranties by 
Seller shall be binding on Buyer. There is no contract unless Seller ac­
cepts this term. Shipment of goods by Seller constitutes acceptance of 
this limitation." Assume Seller's clerk receives the form, and never 
bothers to read the back of Buyer's order form. An invoice for the 
goods is enclosed with the goods. If the goods are defective forty days 
after sale and delivery, and there are consequential damages, what re­
sult? 
Under the current section 2-207, Buyer would have a contract ei­
ther on its terms or, at worst, the article 2 gap fillers, which include the 
implied warranty of merchantability. As ever, Buyer has the better of 
the deal. 
Under the new (New) section 2-207, comment 2 suggests that the 
result may well be different. It reads in pertinent part: "By inviting a 
court to determine whether one has 'agreed' to the other's terms, the 
section recognizes the enormous variety of circumstances that may be 
presented to a court under this section and this section gives the court 
greater discretion to include certain terms than former section 2-207 
did." Unlike its predecessors, the new (New) section 2-207 allows a 
court to ask the question whether the Buyer in our hypothetical knew 
or should have known Seller's terms prior to placing its order. Such 
case-sensitive inquiries have, until now, been precluded by the formu­
laic machinations of the current section 2-207. 
By returning to the question of the meaning of the parties' agree­
ment to the purview of the common law judge, the current article 2 
drafting committee has managed to break out of the conceptual 
gridlock that has held generations of reformers in its grip. I can only 
hope this effort survives the machinations of the approval process.21 
21. I refer, of course, to the ALI and NCCUSL. Formidable interests often present ob­
stacles to rational discussion. See Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a 
Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 743, 745-46 (1993). 
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APPENDIX 
PROPOSED REVISIONS OF 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2 • 207 
MARCH,2000 
(Vol. 98:2738 
SECTION 2-207. TERMS OF CONTRACT; EFFECT OF CONFIRMATION 
(a) If (i) conduct by both parties recognizes the existence of a contract 
although their records do not otherwise establish a contract, (ii) a con­
tract is formed by an offer and acceptance, or (iii) a contract formed in 
any manner is confirmed by a record which contains terms additional 
to or different from those in the contract being confirmed, the terms of 
the contract, subject to Section 2-202, are: 
(1) terms that appear in the records of both parties, 
(2) terms, whether in a record or not, to which both parties have 
agreed, and 
(3) terms supplied or incorporated under any provision of this 
[Act]. 
(b) Terms to which the buyer has not otherwise agreed that are deliv­
ered to the buyer with the goods become part of the contract, subject 
to 2-202, only if: 
(1) the buyer does not within [twenty] [thirty] days of their re­
ceipt object to the terms and offer to return the goods at the 
seller's expense, 
(2) the terms do not contradict the terms of the parties' agree­
ment, and 
(3) taken as a whole, the terms do not materially alter the con­
tract to the detriment of the buyer. 
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[(c) A contract formed by the interaction of an individual and an elec­
tronic agent (Section 2-204(e)(2)) does not include terms provided by 
the individual if the individual had reason to know that the agent 
could not react to the terms as provided.] 
[Reporter's Note B Subsection ( c) is bracketed as an internal place 
marker. This subsection is likely to be moved into the provisions on 
electronic contracting.] 
[Reporter's Note B The following Preliminary Comment was drafted by 
a committee member.] 
Preliminary Comment 
Changes: Subsection (a) is in part a reformulation of original Section 
2-207 (original Section 2-207(1), in modified form, has been moved 
and is now Section 2-206(c)). It also states the terms of contracts gen­
erally, including contracts in which there has been no "battle of the 
forms." Subsection (b) addresses the effectiveness of terms delivered 
with the goods after a contract has been formed. 
Comments: 
1. Subsection (a) applies only when a contact has been formed under 
other provisions of Article 2. Its function is to define the terms of that 
contract. Where forms are exchanged b_efore or during performance, 
the subsection differs from former 2-207 and the common law in that it 
gives no preference to the first or the last form; it applies the same test 
to the terms in each. Terms in a record that insist on all of that rec­
ord's terms and no others as a condition of contract formation have no 
effect on the operation of this subsection. (Of course where one 
party's record insists on its own terms as a condition to contract for­
mation and where that party does not thereafter perform or otherwise 
acknowledge the existence of a contract, the record's insistence on its 
own terms will keep a contract from being formed under sections 2-
204 or 2-206, and section 2-207 will not be applicable.) As with former 
2-207, courts will have to distinguish between "confirmations" that are 
addressed in section 2-207 and "modifications" that are addressed in 
section 2-209. 
2. By inviting a court to determine whether a party has "agreed" 
to the other party's terms, the section recognizes the enormous variety 
of circumstances that may be presented to a court under this section 
and this section gives the court greater discretion to include certain 
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terms than former section 2-207 did. In most cases mere performance 
should not be construed to be agreement to terms on another's record 
by one who has sent or will send its own record with additional or dif­
ferent terms. Thus a party who sends a confirmation with additional or 
different terms should not be regarded as having agreed to any of the 
other's additional or different terms by performance; in that case the 
terms are found under (a)(l) (terms in both records) and (4) (terms 
supplied by the code). By the same reasoning, performance after an 
original agreement between the parties (orally, electronically or oth­
erwise) should not normally be construed to be agreement to terms on 
the other's record unless that record is part of the original agreement. 
The rule would be different where no agreement precedes the per­
formance and only one party sends a record. If, for example, a buyer 
sends a purchase order, there is no oral or other agreement and the 
seller delivers in response to the purchase order but does not send its 
own acknowledgment or acceptance, the seller should normally be 
treated as having agreed to the terms of the purchase order. 
In other cases a court might find agreement to some of the addi­
tional or different terms that appear in only one record. If, for exam­
ple, both parties' forms called for the sale of 700,000 nuts and bolts but 
the purchase order or another record of the buyer conditioned the sale 
on a test of a sample to see if the nuts and bolts would perform prop­
erly, the seller's sending a small sample to the buyer might be con­
strued to be an agreement to the buyer's condition. A court could also 
find that the contract called for arbitration where both forms provided 
for arbitration but each contained slightly different arbitration provi­
sions. There is a limitless variety of verbal and non verbal behavior 
that may be claimed to be an agreement to another's record. The sec­
tion leaves the interpretation of that behavior to the wise discretion of 
the courts. 
3. Subsection (b) is intended to strike a balance between the 
buyer's need for protection from unexpected and unfair terms which 
the buyer does not see until the product is delivered and the seller's 
need for an inexpensive way of contracting with its buyers. To the ex­
tent that Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147(7th Cir. 1997) finds that 
no agreement exists at the end of a telephone exchange in which the 
seller agrees to ship and the buyer agrees to pay, the subsection rejects 
the reasoning in Gateway. The section also rejects the conclusion that 
the terms of the resulting contract are not to be found by applying sec­
tion 2-207. However in normal commercial and consumer cases like 
Gateway, the rules in subsection (b) are intended to make terms that 
are delivered with a product part of the contract. Where the buyer 
does not object, the terms do not contradict the terms of the parties' 
"agreement" (not including Article 2 default terms, see 1-201(3)) and 
the terms delivered with the product contain some sugar (express war-
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ran ties, promises of help or maintenance) with the medicine (dis­
claimers, and other conventional limitations on remedies) those terms 
will become part of the contract under subsection (b ). 
Where the buyer makes a timely objection to the terms and offers 
to return the goods at seller's expense, and the seller accepts, the con­
tract is canceled. Where the seller refuses that offer, the contract con­
tinues but without the terms that were delivered with the product. 
4. Since subsection (b) applies only when the parties have not 
"otherwise agreed" to the terms, sellers who are fearful either that 
buyers will object or that the terms with the product may be found ma­
terially to alter the existing contract, may use other methods of con­
tracting . For example some sellers may choose to get agreement to 
their terms electronically or orally before they ship. 
5. Some records that may accompany the goods are not "deliv­
ered" with them under subsection (b ). The subsection is intended to 
deal with terms on the container (ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 
(7th Cir. 1996)), terms in the box (Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105F.3d 1147 
(7th Cir. 1997)), and terms on a label or booklet attached to the goods 
(Mainline Tractor & Equipment C. v. Nutrite Corp., 937 F. Supp. 1095 
(D. Vt. 1996)), but not with conventional commercial form contracting 
documents such as confirmations, invoices or acknowledgments that 
happen to accompany the goods. The terms on such invoices, ac­
knowledgments or the like become part of the contract only under 
subsection (a). 
